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 The Independent Labour Party and the second Labour Government c. 1929-1931: 
   the move towards revolutionary change 
 
     Keith Laybourn 
 
It is generally accepted that the Independent Labour Party disaffiliated from the Labour Party in 
July 1932 because of its reluctance to accept the 1929 revised Standing Orders of the Labour Party 
which forbade all Labour MPs from voting against the Government and committed them to voting 
as directed by the Labour whips, except on grounds of conscience.1 It is argued that the attempt to 
enforce the 1929 Standing Orders in 1932 led to the disaffiliation of the ILP from the Labour Party. 
However, what is less agreed is what led to this state of play. Indeed, why was there so much 
feeling over the new Standing Orders that disaffiliation could be considered the only course of 
action by the majority of ILP delegates who attended the Special Meeting at Bradford in July 1932? 
Why were the new Standing Orders the reason, or pretext for, disaffiliation? In answer to these 
questions, R. E. Dowse, in his book Left in the Centre suggests that there was a clash of 
personalities and policies within the context of the revolutionary fervour of ILP leaders such as 
Fenner Brockway and James Maxton and that this led to disaffiliation.2 It is a view endorsed by 
Alan McKinlay and James. J. Smyth who suggest that the tensions were beginning at the time of the 
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1926 General Strike and the ‘Socialism in Our Time’ campaign which attempted to raise the pace of 
change to socialism, but which also succeeded in dividing regional bodies such as the Scottish ILP.3 
R. K. Middlemass, in his book The Clydesiders, concluded that disaffiliation was a ‘suicide during a 
fit of insanity’.4 More recently, Gidon Cohen has suggested that there was reasoned debate in the 
move towards disaffiliation.5 All three interpretations raise questions about the nature of the 
decision to disaffiliate. The first implies long –term decisions, the second a more immediate 
decision following the collapse of the second Labour government, whilst the third suggests that it 
was a hard fought and reasoned debate led to disaffiliation. Ironically, none of these are exclusive of 
each other, although they clearly vary in emphasis. The fact is that there had been tensions between 
the ILP and the Labour Party before the formation of the second Labour government, during the 
administration of the second Labour government, and afterwards. The second Labour government 
merely heightened the potential for conflict and division. But, as David Howell has reflected, there 
may be no clearly defined explanation based upon the Labour Party’s gradualism and the battle over 
Standing Orders, for neither issue would have gained a majority for disaffiliation. Indeed, as Howell 
writes, ‘The trajectory of the ILP in the decade after 1922 cannot be captured adequately in the 
narrative of socialist disenchantment with the compromises of gradualism.’ 6 Nevertheless, nuanced 
or not, the narrative of the second Labour government provided the context and the final reason for 
disaffiliation. 
The ILP famously voted to leave the Labour Party at a Special Conference of the ILP held at 
Jowett Hall, Bradford in July and August 1932, almost a year after the end of the second Labour 
government. The fact that there was an intervening period of a year between the end of the Labour 
Government and disaffiliation has meant that considerable emphasis has been placed upon the 
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events of that year, most markedly the famous negotiations over Standing Orders between the ILP 
and the Labour Party in May and June 1932.7 Labour’s general election defeat of October 1931, 
when Labour’s parliamentary representation fell from 291 (in 1929 and 287 in 1931) to 52, had 
certainly pressured the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) to tighten ranks and to seek the full 
application of the new Standing Orders of 1929. Yet one should not forget that throughout the term 
of the second Labour government the reformed ILP group under Jimmy Maxton had simply ignored 
the new Standing Orders, as did a total of 126 Labour MPs throughout the lifetime of the second 
Labour administration.8 Indeed, the fight over the revised Standing Orders was as fervently played 
out in more than two years of a second Labour government as it was in the year after its fall. Indeed, 
the ILP MPs became intense critics of the ‘gradualist’ Labour government and Labour Party and 
some of them began to advocate a ‘new revolutionary policy’ en route to disaffiliation. The period 
of the second Labour government was thus crucial in, and central to, the process of political change 
within the ILP. It ensured that the disaffiliationists, probably a minority at the time of the second 
Labour government, were able to secure the majority of support they needed for their policy of 
disaffiliation and revolutionary change. 
  This tension between the ILP, on the one hand, and the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) 
and second Labour government, on the other, was hardly unexpected given the protean nature of the 
Labour Party. The fact is that the ILP had always exercised its political independence of the PLP. 
Indeed, Fenner Brockway, sometime Chairman of the ILP and long-time editor of its paper the New 
Leader, summarized this long–standing policy and practice in the New Leader, 10 July 1931, 
stressing that the ILP MPs had always accepted the policies of the Labour Party Conference except 
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on the issue of armaments: ‘The Labour Party believing in decision by international agreement, the 
ILP by national example.’9 In June 1932 he added that the ILP had always honoured its ‘conditions 
of affiliation’ to the Labour Party but at the same time had ‘maintained its right to advocate 
Socialist policies beyond the Labour programme. That right has never been and should not be 
challenged.’10  
  In order to defend that position the ILP had in fact taken a decision at its 1930 Easter 
Conference (held at Birmingham) to reconstruct its Parliamentary group on a resolution on ‘basis of 
acceptance of the policy of the ILP’ as agreed at its annual conferences and the NAC.11 It was 
carried by a vote of 7 to 1, after a vigorous debate in which the minority expressed the view that 
such an action would fragment socialism and halt the socialist advance.12 This effectively meant 
that the ILP was intending to act as a party within a party but discussions took place and appeared 
to resolve the differences between the ILP and the Labour Party on 25 July 1930. However, on 30 
July 1930 the ILP, without warning the Labour Party, re-issued its request for ILP MPs to pledge 
themselves to the policies of the ILP. This led to a spate of meetings and correspondence between 
the ILP and the Labour Party in July and August 1930. The discussions went into November and 
December, when the ILP attempted to force ILP - sponsored MPs to commit themselves to a pledge 
of loyalty to the ILP.13 Alongside this was the demand of the NEC of the Labour Party and the PLP 
that the revised Standing Orders of 1929 should be accepted, the failure of which leading to Tom 
Irwin’s parliamentary campaign in East Renfrew in November 1930 being supported only by the 
ILP. The fact is that these types of conflicts between the ILP’s demand for the loyalty of its 
members and the Labour Party/PLP demand for the loyalty of the ILP MPs, rumbled on throughout 
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the entire period of the second Labour government. The debate over Standing Orders might have 
heated up in the summer months of 1932 but it was an ever-present issue in 1930 and 1931. 
Crucial to the decision of the ILP not to compromise on their assumed rights of 
independence of action was the political record of the second Labour government which offered 
proof positive of the failure of socialist ‘gradualism’ to some sections of the ILP and spurred them 
along the route to more revolutionary policies. As Fenner Brockway stated at the Easter Conference 
of the ILP in March 1932 
If the experience of a Labour Government had filled the minds of only the working 
class section of the electorate with a positive faith and a positive sense of achievement 
they would be immune to all the power and scorn of the Capitalist Parties. It was the failure 
of the Labour Government during these months of office which made the minds of the 
working class in a negative condition which easily responded to the negative phrases and 
fears during the three weeks of the election.14 
To some sections of the ILP the second Labour government was a missed opportunity and the 
introduction of socialism now required a new direction.  
       I 
Despite this frustration with the second Labour government one should not forget that there were 
tensions developing between the ILP and the Labour Party long before 1929. The ILP, formed as a 
national socialist party at Bradford in 1893, had seen itself as the intellectual godparent of the 
Labour Representation Committee and the Labour Party in the early twentieth century. However, it 
had had to reassess its position in 1918 when the Labour Party committed itself to socialism. 
Eventually resolving to remain in existence and affiliated to the Labour Party in the early 1920s, it 
sought to influence the Labour Party through its growing influence on the Clydeside. In exercised 
some significant parliamentary influence and was largely responsible for the PLP electing James 
Ramsay MacDonald as Labour Leader in 1922. However, its relations with MacDonald and the first 
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Labour government of 1924 went sour, even though John Wheatley, Fred Jowett, and other ILP 
activists, did gain office in that government. Indeed, there is the infamous remark of MacDonald, at 
10 Downing Street, when presented with a resolution from the ILP parliamentary group: ‘Well, 
Brockway, what commands have you brought me today.’15  
Nevertheless relations between the ILP and the Labour Party had been relatively good up to 
that point in the 1920s, Clifford Allen, the ILP Chairman, maintaining a close personal friendship 
with MacDonald. However, once Fred Jowett took over from Allen as Chairman in 1925 and James 
Maxton replaced him in 1926, relations grew much worse. The ‘Socialism in Our Time’ programme 
that the ILP mounted in the mid 1920s divided members of the ILP and worsened relations with the 
Labour Party, whose Leader was willing to point to the contradictions in the programme. Indeed, 
drawn up by Clifford Allen, and friends, and advocating gradual ameliorative policies such as the 
living wage, the campaign stressed the need to redistribute the income to the mass consumers in 
order to create the home demand that would reduce unemployment. However, once Allen was 
removed by the Clydesiders the preamble was amended to indicate that the need to bring about the 
collapse of capitalism when it was evident that the majority of the policy was designed to make 
capitalism work more efficiently in the interest of the workers.16 Several months before the new 
policy was approved by the ILP Conference in April 1926 its advocates stated that ‘They believed 
that ‘the old order was breaking down’ and that resolute socialist policies would be need to ‘carry 
us through the period of transition from the old to the new civilisation’.17  
MacDonald and the Labour Party pointed to these contradictions and largely dismissed the 
campaign much to the annoyance of the Clydeside section of the ILP.18 MacDonald feared that the 
living wage policy, with its effective advocacy of a national minimum wage, would be a ‘millstone’ 
around the neck of the Labour Party and that socialism would arise out of the healthy aspects of 
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society and not its failing sections.19 It was condemned further by MacDonald at the Labour Party 
Conference in 1927 as ‘a programme of flashy futilities’.20 In addition, there was some local 
disquiet amongst ILP members. The Bradford ILP discussed the ;living wage policy’ in February 
1926 and voted in favour although there was criticism from Councillor Brooke who was ‘anxious 
lest trade union power should be undermined’ and others who felt that ‘Socialism in Our Time’ 
would ‘bolster up the capitalist system’.21  Some clearly felt that the proposal was ‘fathered by 
Impatience and mothered in Piety’.22 
This rising conflict between the ILP and the Labour was markedly evident at the Labour 
Party conference held at Birmingham in 1928, when Labour’s general election manifesto Labour 
and the Nation was debated over three days. MacDonald emphasised the need for gradual change to 
state action to deal with unemployment, the assumption being that unemployment was a failure of 
capitalism and that socialism would ultimately deal with it. MacDonald’s critics talked of class 
conflict and the need for faster moves towards socialism. However, Jimmy Maxton did admit that 
socialism could no longer be approached by a ‘long, slow process of gradualist, peaceful, 
Parliamentary change’ and declared that once the programme was implemented socialism would be 
still as far away as ever, ending with the cry ‘let your slogan be: “ Socialism is the only remedy”’.23 
Tensions were clearly running high even before the second Labour government came to 
power in June 1929 and even before MacDonald consigned most of the ILP’s 37 (of 291 Labour) 
MPs to the back benches cramped and confined by with new Standing Orders that aimed to prevent 
them voting against raising amendments to government legislation or voting against it. The ILP was 
not about to be muzzled.  
      II 
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Shortly after the ILP disaffiliated from the Labour Party in July 1932, Brockway wrote an article on 
‘Why the ILP left the Labour Party’. In it he stressed emphatically that ‘We have heard much of 
loyalty. It was not that the ILP which was guilty of disloyalty. It was the Labour government.’24 He 
reiterated that the ILP had always maintained its freedom of action in the House of Commons, 
whilst remaining loyal to the socialist decisions of Labour Party conferences, but explained how it 
had become disenchanted by ‘gradualism’ of the Labour Party and the policies of the second 
Labour government. To him, and many members of the ILP, the Labour government had abandoned 
its responsibility to introduce socialism. To Brockway it was the ‘gradualism’ of the Labour Party 
and the capitalism of the Labour government that had led to the ILP’s disaffiliation and he 
anticipated a new more revolutionary approach to socialism, whilst reminding his readers that it was 
going to be one developed by the ILP in a British context not one adopted by the Communist Party: 
‘The rigidity of mind and method of the British Communist Party makes it incapable of appealing 
to the mass British working class or of adopting policies applicable to the British situation.’25 
  Brockway had previously listed the failures of the Labour government at the Easter 
Conference of the ILP in 1932 when, as Chairman, he had discussed ‘The Coming Revolution’.26 
His argument was that the Labour Government had failed because it did not press forward with 
socialist policies. He dismissed the view that it could not act because it was a minority government 
by stressing that, in that case, it should not have taken office. But he argued that even as a minority 
government it could have pressed ahead with socialist measures and forced the other political 
parties to reject them and form a coalition government, or that it could have ignored parliamentary 
defeats and hung on to power as long as it could in an attempt to highlight the need for socialist 
measures. Instead it flirted with capitalism: ‘It meant going from compromise to compromise. It 
meant that a Government which called itself Labour actually became the instrument of making the 
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condition of the working class worse,….’27 Brockway then outlined some of the policies of the 
Labour government, and particularly the Anomalies Bill, which deprived many unemployed 
married women of their rights to insurance. In the final analysis, Brockway’s explanation of the 
failure of the second Labour government and disaffiliation was that gradualism would not achieve 
socialism and that the minority Labour government simply failed to carry out socialist policies. The 
failure of the second Labour government was to be the platform for a flexible and more 
revolutionary policy that would be fought out within the ILP throughout the 1930s.  
      III 
The second Labour government quite simply intensified the perpetual conflict of political 
independence between the ILP and the Labour Party. Reflecting upon the second Labour in January 
1932, almost equidistant between the resignation of the second Labour government and 
disaffiliation, Brockway asserted that apart from the tensions between the ILP and the Labour Party 
in the 1920s ‘There was the further shock which followed the futility of the Labour Government of 
1929 to 1931.’28  
From the formation of the second Labour government in June 1929 the ILP MPs were 
opposed to many of its policies. Maxton and most sections of the ILP opposed to the Labour 
Government’s Unemployment Insurance proposals in the autumn of 1929, advocating amendments 
which it considered to be in line with the more generous approach agreed at Labour Party 
conferences and the Trades Union Congress.29 The complaints of Fred Jowett, Jimmy Maxton and 
John Wheatley were that only an extra £12 million per year was being made available for the 
unemployed and that a higher level of expenditure was required, that they could not agree with the 
‘not genuinely seeking work’ clause which would have denied benefits to some of the unemployed, 
and that they objected to the clause preventing payments to the newly unemployed for the first six 
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days.30 In the end, the Government proposals were amended and ‘dole’, or transitional payments for 
those without automatic benefits who had made contributions to the Unemployment Fund, was 
made easier to obtain. However, this opposition to the unemployment policies signalled both the 
difficulties that were to emerge between the ILP and the second Labour government and the serious 
tensions within the ILP between its factions within its Parliamentary Group and throughout the 
country.31 
The fact is that the actions of Maxton, Jowett and Wheatley led to some criticism of the 
second Labour government. Patrick Dollan, and a large section of Scottish ILPers, remained loyal 
to the second Labour government. Indeed, one ILP loyalist reflected that ‘Wheatley will stop at 
nothing in his frenzy to bring Mac down.’32  Evidently, not all ILP members saw the second Labour 
government as already being a failure. 
Initially there was a willingness amongst some of the ILP rank and file in the regions to 
accept that this issue was a teething problem faced by a minority government. A Huddersfield ILP 
wrote that. 
Prevented from carrying out a real Socialist programme, through the lack of a 
Parliamentary majority, the Government has nevertheless made every effort to put 
some new spirit into capitalist enterprise. A new overseas Trade Development Council 
has been created and the Trade Mission are to go, or have gone, to South America….33 
This particular passage, indeed, hints at acceptance of MacDonald’s general assumption that 
socialism would arise out of the success of capitalism. Such optimism was not to last. 
Within a few months of this conflict the ILP felt obliged to re-iterate its long-held belief that 
it had a duty to act as the socialist conscience of Labour. Its long-assumed political and tactical 
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independence was asserted further by the National Administrative Council’s statement to the ILP 
Conference of Easter 1930: 
 But the I.L.P. has always been an independent Socialist organisation making its distinctive 
contribution to Labour Party policy and having its distinctive function within the Party. 
Whilst the I.L.P. has worked with loyalty to the Labour Party principles, its liberty of action 
when fundamental Socialist issues are involved has not been questioned. Throughout the 
period of the war, and on many occasions before and since, I.L.P. members in Parliament, 
including several members of the present Government, have felt it necessary to vote 
according to their convictions, even though the majority of the Party took another view. 
  The suggestion is now made that all Labour members of Parliament and all Labour  
 candidates should undertake never to vote against the Government. It is unreasonable to ask 
members of the Party to accept without question all the proposals of the Government when 
those proposals are not themselves subject to the decisions of the Parliamentary Party, and 
in many instances do not comply with the programme authorised by the Labour 
Conference.34 
The ILP was prepared to reprimand the recalcitrant child it had helped to produce, as it 
fledged into the party of government. Indeed, James Maxton, the Chairman at the 1930 ILP 
Conference, informed his audience that despite the Labour Party declaring itself to be socialist in 
1918 the ILP, after a lengthy debate concluded in the early 1920s that ‘our work was not nearly 
finished and that we should apply our minds to bringing Socialism in to the political and social 
affairs of this nation as an objective of speedy realisation’.35 To Maxton and the ILP the Labour 
government was far too gradualist and ineffective and believed that a more revolutionary approach 
                                                     
34
  J. Maxton, Where the I.L.P. Stands  (London, ILP, 1930), p.14. 
35
   Ibid., p. 4. 
to socialism was required. His speech on this was subsequently published in a pamphlet entitled 
Where the ILP stands.36 
As a result, the ILP was frequently opposed to the legislation of the Labour government. As 
already seen, it was particularly concerned about unemployment and poverty at the end of 1929, 
seeking to amend the Unemployment Insurance Bill of 1929. It also sought to amend the Coal 
Mines Bill of 1930, in order to introduce a minimum wage. It made amendments to the attempt to 
form a Public Loans Board. In October 1930 Fred Jowett, the ILP MP for Bradford East, moved an 
amendment to the King’s Speech explaining that ‘Socialism is the official policy of the Labour 
Party and it was not recognised in the King’s Speech.’37 The ILP also opposed local interference in 
the maintenance allowances in the Education Bill and also sought the extension of rights during the 
discussion of the legislation on National Health Insurance between December 1930 and January 
1931, stressed the need for extended membership on the Committee of Privileges, opposed all army, 
navy and air force estimates as a matter of principle, and demanded an alternative vote in the 
Representation of the People’s Bill.38  There was also a general criticism of the Labour 
government’s failure to put into place a trial for the Meerut prisoners in India. 
At the Labour Party annual conference held at Llandudno in October 1930, famous more for 
the debate and vote on Mosley’s policy than anything else, the MacDonald, by popular acclaim, 
made a brilliant speech in defending the government’s performance on public works for the 
unemployed. Nevertheless, Maxton, moved what was effectively a vote of censure on the Labour 
government but it was defeated by 1,800,000 votes to 330,000.39 In the wake of this the ILP 
Parliamentary Group discussed the Mosley ‘memorandum’ economic policies for Britain and 
rejected them, although five ILP MPs did support Mosley’s radical policies. But that was merely an 
interim distraction and more serious conflict was to come. 
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  Subsequently, the ILP’s disagreement on the policy for the unemployed led to a speech by 
Brockway in the House of Commons, made at the time of the Conservative Motion of  
Censure of 1 April 1931, to be published under the title A Socialist Plan for Unemployment. The 
Conservative vote of censure was based upon the failure of Labour’s unemployment but the ILP 
amendment to this outlined a socialist policy for unemployment based upon the Socialism in Our 
Time programme of establishing a living wage, raising the school-leaving age, reducing the hours 
of the working week, increasing old-age pensions, unemployment allowances and widows pensions, 
developing a national housing scheme, and extending credits to Russia in the areas of shipbuilding 
and engineering. On this occasion the ILP voted against the Conservative motion of because it felt 
that ‘the Conservative Party are more the political enemies of the unemployed than any other 
section.’40 Brockway dismissed the Conservative policies on unemployment as attempts to further 
worsen the condition of the unemployed by reducing ‘dole’ and attempts drive the long-term 
unemployed to despair by separating those unemployed for more than a year from the rest of the 
unemployed. Brockway attacked their penchant for tariffs, which he saw as equally unsatisfactory 
as free trade. Reflecting the ILP position, he criticised the failure of the Labour government to 
tackle unemployment through socialist measures, regretted its acceptance of the need to increase 
productivity before unemployment could be properly tackled, and reminded the Government that 
whilst the ILP group would vote against the Conservative censure but ‘if the Government are to 
secure our support, their unemployment policy must be based upon Socialist principles’.41 
Ultimately, that meant to the ILP a minimum standard of living, nationalisation and national 
planning, and the setting up of import and export boards to control imports and exports. 
The second Labour government did not heed the warning from, what was by then, the 
fragmented ranks of the ILP Parliamentary Group that was divided and losing some ILP MPs to 
Mosley’s New Party. Most famously the ILP rebels opposed the second Labour government’s 
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Anomalies Bill, debated in Parliament in June and July 1931. When enacted it eventually deprived 
up to 200,000 insured married women of the right to unemployment benefits simply because they  
were unemployed but married to employed husbands and working in areas where there was no work 
and where they were deemed as not ‘genuinely seeking work’.42 This was blatantly discriminatory 
for it did not relate to men, married or single, or single women, who had paid their contributions but 
were seeking work in similar areas where there was no work to be had. The Bill was introduced by 
Margaret Bondfield, the Minister of Labour, and supported by Dr. Marion Phillips, MP for 
Sunderland and secretary and Chief Woman Organiser of the Women’s Section of the Labour 
Party.43 Although the second reading was carried overwhelmingly by 231 votes to 19, with about 60 
per cent of MPs not voting, it was a mixture of ILP MPs and Conservatives who opposed this 
measure which was designed to save a mere £5 million for the Treasury.  
George Buchanan, Jimmy Maxton and Fenner Brockway headed a small group of about a 
dozen ILP ‘rebel’ MPs, including Fred Jowett , Jennie Lee  and J. F. Horrabin , who opposed the 
Bill. Brockway asked ‘Why do women who claim their legal rights become spongers?’ adding that 
‘The working women who is married if she has a legal right to benefit has the right to get it without 
being blackballed and libelled….’44 He also complained of the ‘grave abuses that the unemployed 
suffer’.45 As a result they forced an all-night session in which they forced 32 divisions on the Bill. 
However, it was Duff Cooper, a Conservative MP, who probably did the Government most damage 
when he accurately reflected that 
There had been only two whole-hearted and effective speeches made on behalf of the Bill, 
the speech of the right hon. Lady who introduced the Bill and the speech of the hon. Lady  
the Member for Sunderland. It is remarkable, perhaps regrettable, that a Bill that is going to 
affect so seriously the position of so many married women could find only two sound 
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supporters in the house, and both should be ladies and both should be single.46 
Indeed, the Anomalies Bill was considered by Brockway to be the overwhelming 
justification for the ILP’s willingness to flout Labour’s new Standing Orders.47 At the subsequent 
ILP’ Easter Conference of 1932, he reflected that this Bill was one of the worst examples of the 
failure of the second Labour government: 
The Labour Government became responsible for this cruel measure as a result of one of the 
meanest capitalist agitations this country has ever witnessed. It was in literal truth an 
agitation to rob the pittance of the unemployed in order to safeguard the luxury incomes of 
rich from increased taxation. The same agitation compelled the representatives of the 
Labour government to accept the principles of the Means Test on the Parliamentary 
Committee and to agree the May Committee which resulted in the cut in unemployment 
benefit rates, the wages of public workers, the social services – which the National 
Government has since imposed.48 
Throughout the period of the second Labour government, then, the ILP had been critical of 
many of Labour’s policies. Indeed, even when it supported the Government against a motion of no 
confidence on 1 April 1931 Fenner Brockway made it clear that the ILP support was because it 
feared the opposition parties had no better plans than Labour for the unemployed, although 
Brockway added that he also hoped that the government would introduce an unemployment policy 
based upon ‘Socialist principles’ and that that would gain the support of the back-benchers.49  The 
ILP’s political support was conditional. 
  The political defection of Ramsay MacDonald in August 1931, his formation of a National 
Government, and the calling of a general election in October 1931 brought matters to a head. The 
Labour Party demanded that all its parliamentary candidates should sign a document accepting the 
revised Standing Orders of the Labour Party. As a result 19 ILP candidates refused to sign and were 
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thus not endorsed by the Labour Party. Three of them were amongst the five ILP MPs 
who were elected in the 1931 general election – Jimmy Maxton, R. C. Wallhead and John 
McGovern and were joined by two successful ILP trade unionists, David Kirkwood and George 
Buchanan, who also declined to accept Standing Orders. These five ILP MPs formed the ILP 
Group in the new Parliament and were not admitted to the meetings of the PLP. Matters were not 
helped by the fact that the Labour Party Conference of October 1931 did not accept that the 
ILP could act as the organised socialist conscience of the Labour Party. Negotiations between the 
ILP and the Labour Party faltered and the issue of disaffiliation was seriously raised at the ILP’s 
‘Easter Conference of 1932 whereby a narrow majority [188 votes to 144] the delegates rejected 
disaffiliation and voted in favour [by 250 to 53] of the Scottish amendment for conditional 
affiliation. 
A similar motion at the Easter Conference of 1931 had been defeated by 173 votes to 37 
Nevertheless, as a result of the 1932 vote negotiations were re-opened between J. S Middleton, 
Assistant Secretary of the Labour Party, and John Paton, of the ILP, in the hope that a compromise 
might be arranged. In the end, this was not to be for, as already indicated, the negotiations of May 
to June 1932 failed to achieve a compromise. 
     IV 
Even though the vote in favour of disaffiliation was carried in July 1932 one must not assume that 
the majority members of the ILP were opposed to working with the Labour Party. As already 
indicated the resolution to disaffiliate from the Labour Party had not  been carried. The fact is 
that many ILP supporters, former ILP and Labour MPs, had voted against the various pieces of 
legislation put forward by the second Labour government from time to time without wishing  
to disaffiliate or leave the Labour Party. The various estimates, offered by Brockway, Jowett, and 
others, suggest that 126 Labour MPs, from all sides of the Party, voted against the legislation put 
forward by the second Labour government.50 Whilst some of those were ILP MPs who became 
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committed to both disaffiliation and the new revolutionary policy others were not William Leach, 
an ILP MP for Bradford Central and Undersecretary in the Treasury of the first Labour government, 
was strongly opposed to disaffiliation and campaigned against it fervently in the Bradford Pioneer,  
the ILP and Labour paper. A close friend, and one-time employer, of Fred Jowett, the MP for  
Bradford East, he wrote numerous articles in the Pioneer at that time edited by Frank Betts, the 
father of Barbara Castle. Leach complained, contentiously, that the ILP was weakening the whole 
movement as it had the second Labour government, ‘by its continuous assertion of Labour 
untrustworthiness, and yapping at the heals of the present leaders’.51 In July 1932 he suggested that 
there were disappointed vanities at work within some sections of the ILP and ‘that MacDonald and 
Co. have gone East, the disaffiliationists would go West. All the fruits of ill will, antagonism and  
open war are bound to follow in both cases.’52 
  At the 1932 Bradford Special Conference itself E. F. Wise, one of the intellectuals in the 
Party who had been attracted into it by Clifford Allen, opposed disaffiliation stating that whilst ‘he 
made no attempt to defend the actions of the last Labour Government, nor did he reject a simple 
vote against them. But he saw nothing in Standing Orders to prevent members saying what they 
pleased inside and outside the Parliamentary Labour Party.’53  
  Others agreed with this sentiment, and many members were to leave the ILP between 1932 
and unable and unwilling to leave Labour or to accept the new revolutionary policy. Before the 
decision was taken John Arnott called for the Labour Party to prevent the ILP’s defection.54  The 
Leeds Citizen concurred and stressed that ‘If the ILP is dissatisfied with the Labour Party it will not 
improve it by committing suicide in a passion of indignation.’55 In the wake of disaffiliation only 
one of the 32 members of the Labour Group on Bradford Council left the Labour Party, the Bramley 
ILP agreed to remain with the Labour Party, and on 24 September 1932 a Yorkshire Conference of 
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Affiliated ILPers was held.56  Patrick Dollan, in control of a substantial proportion of the Glasgow 
ILP, formed the Scottish Socialist Party which claimed 107 ILP branches and about 50 per cent of 
the Glasgow ILP membership, in an attempt to remain loyal to the Labour Party.57 Others agreed 
with the sentiments and many others were to leave in 1934 and 1935, unable to accept the new 
revolutionary policy of the ILP or convinced of the need to develop Marxist policies. A rather sad 
editorial in the Bradford Pioneer, presumably written by Frank Betts. concurred with the fears of 
those who felt that the ILP would now go into political oblivion. 
 The Independent Labour Party now joins the numerous small groups engaged in 
 useless and obscure warfare against the organised Labour army. Along with the 
 Communist Party, the Socialist Party of Great Britain and other eccentric groups quite 
 unknown to the general public, the total sterility of a once great and influential party 
 seems assured.58 
In the end the ILP determined on disaffiliation, a course of action which a substantial part of its 
membership could not accept. It was only the furore caused by the second Labour government, and 
the constant pressure by Maxton, Brockway and the other leading figures, that seems to have given 
Brockway, Maxton, and others of a disaffiliationist mind the support they sought.  
     V 
The Independent Labour Party was clearly at odds with the Labour Party throughout 
the 1920s and early 1930s. Yet once it had determined to continue as an independent socialist party 
affiliated to the Labour Party it had re-emphasised its continued commitment the introduction of 
socialism. It felt free to express its concern at the failure of the 1924 minority Labour government to 
press forward with socialist measures. Anxious to speed up the process of introducing socialism it 
developed the ‘Socialism in Our Time’ campaign in the mid 1920s, which brought it into conflict 
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with Ramsay MacDonald and the Labour Party. The final straw was the second Labour government 
which Brockway described as a ‘futile failure’. Despite attempts to muzzle internal opposition 
through the revised Standing Orders of the PLP, the ILP MPs regularly voted against the second 
Labour government, particularly on the issue of unemployment. Its failure to deliver 
socialism, indeed its commitment to operating capitalism, convinced the ILP that it should pursue 
revolutionary rather than gradualist policies in establishing socialism. In the end that 
meant that the ILP some members of the ILP felt that would have to disaffiliate from the Labour  
Party. The problems with the second Labour government made the ILP’s disaffiliation inevitable 
given the Labour Party’s insistence upon imposing the new Standing Orders to prevent ILP MPs 
from voting according to their own wishes. The record of the second Labour government almost 
ensured that the ILP would flee the Labour Party nest. The timescale of the ILP’s disaffiliation 
arises largely from what is perceived to be the failure and futility of the second Labour government. 
      VI 
In any epilogue it is clear that the ILP abandoned its gradualist policy of ‘Socialism in Our Time; 
when at its 1933 conference held at Derby it accepted a ‘new revolutionary policy’. This was based  
upon a type of syndicalist workers’council programme, although it meant different things to 
different sections of the ILP. In it the ILP, advocated the creation of a United Revolutionary Party 
with the Communists and favoured approaching the Comintern, the international organisation of 
communism, for membership. The Revolutionary Policy Committee of the ILP, powerful in London 
and led by Dr. Cullen, pushed for a close association with the communists. However, it was 
opposed by the Unity Group, strong in London, East Anglia and Lancashire, that 
attempted to overturn the ‘new revolutionary policy’ and emphasise the parliamentary and ethical 
aspects of socialism but, failing to do so in 1934, separated from the ILP and formed the 
Independent Socialist Party, taking much of the ILP membership with it. Other Trotskyist elements 
formed the ‘Marxist Group and also opposed the ‘new revolutionary policy’. Finally, a fragmented 
and weakened ILP rejected any affiliation to the Comintern conference at its York conference in 
1934.  
After that the ILP’s ‘new revolutionary policy’ grew less relevant as the party splintered 
further and declined rapidly. What is important to realise here, however, is that the second Labour 
government convinced some powerful sections of the ILP that there was a need for a change in 
policy and the end of gradualism. In this context the need to disaffiliate from the Labour Party 
seemed logical and necessary although the alternative policy never seemed well defined or 
universally understood by all the various sections of the ILP. In the end many of the leading 
figures who been involved in the ILP’s disaffiliation later expressed that disaffiliation was a  
mistake.59 But it was a mistake engineered and galvanised partly, possibly substantially by the 
failures of the second Labour government.  
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